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Introduction
Hong Kong has played an important role in connecting China’s econ-omy with the rest of the world since the nineteenth century. BeforeWorld War II (WWII), Hong Kong mainly served as an entrepot be-
tween China and Western countries in merchandise trade. Hong Kong’s eco-
nomic ties with mainland China continued to grow despite the latter’s shift
to a socialist economy since 1949. When the United Nations began to put a
trade embargo on China during the Korean War (1950-1953), Hong Kong’s
transit trade business fell sharply. The development of the manufacturing sec-
tor since the 1950s saved Hong Kong’s economy from a major depression.
Nonetheless, the export-led economic growth pattern did not last long. In
the 1970s, Hong Kong manufacturers encountered fierce competition from
other developing countries as well as advanced countries’ growing protec-
tionism. The launch of China’s open-door policy at the end of 1978 came just
in time to alleviate the difficulties of Hong Kong’s manufacturing economy. 
Since 1979, when China began to set out a series of preferential policies
for foreign investors aimed at exports, Hong Kong entrepreneurs quickly
caught these opportunities. From 1979 to 1995, around half to two-thirds
of foreign direct investment (FDI) in China came from Hong Kong. However,
it was often argued that Hong Kong’s significant share in China’s total FDI
was exaggerated, as it included not only Hong Kong’s investment but also
substantial amounts of capital intermediated through Hong Kong. In addi-
tion, a substantial portion of the mainland’s exports to other countries was
also channelled through Hong Kong. While Hong Kong accounted for a
major share of China’s total exports, China’s imports from the territory were
relatively less noteworthy. 
Hong Kong’s unique geographic location as a gateway between mainland
China and other countries allowed the territory to benefit from China’s rel-
atively closed economy. However, China’s economy today is much more
open than it was several decades ago. From 1985, the Special Economic
Zones (SEZs) extended more widely from coastal cities in Guangdong and
Fujian to the Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta, Shandong Peninsula,
Liaodong Peninsula, Hebei, and Guangxi. Deng Xiaoping’s speech during his
southern tour in China in 1992 accelerated the country’s economic reform.
China’s trade and investment measures opened a step further after its ac-
cession into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001. Up to November
2015, China had already signed bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) or
quasi-FTAs with major economies (e.g. South Korea, Australia, Singapore,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and New Zealand) in the region. At the multilateral
level, the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area has been in effect since 1 January
2010. China is also actively involved in the China-Japan-South Korea trilat-
eral FTA and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) ne-
gotiations. With effect from 1 October 2016, the Chinese yuan will be
included in the International Monetary Fund’s reserve currency basket, a
significant step in internationalising China’s financial market and its cur-
rency. 
China’s greater involvement in the global economy occurred as Hong
Kong’s economy was becoming closer to China’s. The quick catching up of
other mainland cities further raised concerns about the sustainability of
Hong Kong’s unique position as a bridge between China and other countries.
How has Hong Kong’s service-oriented economy been impacted by China’s
growing linkage with the world over the last decade? It is often argued that
the implementation of the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement
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(CEPA) was a “helping hand” to Hong Kong’s economy. Nonetheless, as
China gradually opens up its market in order to fulfil its obligations under
the WTO and other FTAs, the special treatments given to Hong Kong
through CEPA is expected to dissipate. In this regard, how can Hong Kong
sustain its economic development in the future?
The purpose of this article is to investigate the structural changes in Hong
Kong’s service economy and the development of its economic relations with
China over the last decade. In the face of China’s dynamic development,
this article also addresses concerns and prospects for Hong Kong’s economy
in the future. Macro-economic data is assessed to explore Hong Kong’s serv-
ice-oriented economic profile. Hong Kong’s official statistics in the service
industry are extensively employed as a major indicator of the territory’s
connection with China in services. Service trade statistics incorporate a total
of 12 service items as indicated in Annex 1. Owing to the large presence of
transport, travel, and financial services in Hong Kong’s service trade, statis-
tics for these three service items will be the main focus when analysing
Hong Kong’s service trade relations with China. The implementation of CEPA
is considered a turning point in Hong Kong’s economic transformation.
Hence, the opening up measures between Hong Kong and the mainland
through CEPA, particularly in transport services, financial services, and travel
services, will also be reviewed. 
The article is structured as follows. First, the development of Hong Kong’s
structural changes in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) and employ-
ment by sector is analysed. From the second to the fourth parts, China’s
importance in promoting Hong Kong’s transport services, financial services,
and travel services is elucidated. In spite of closer economic ties, there has
been growing discontent in Hong Kong society against the mainland gov-
ernment. Whether social disintegration with China would cause an eco-
nomic setback for Hong Kong deserves attention. Finally, this article
concludes with some reflections on how Hong Kong and mainland China
can cooperate in order to best serve each other’s economic interests in the
future. 
CEPA accelerated Hong Kong’s shift towards
services 
China and Hong Kong signed “The Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Eco-
nomic Partnership Arrangement,” or “Closer Economic Partnership Arrange-
ment” (CEPA) on 29 June 2003. Initiated by the territory’s business
community, CEPA provides Hong Kong with priority entry into China’s mar-
ket. Under CEPA, some 273 goods produced in Hong Kong, which comprise
two-thirds of Hong Kong’s domestic exports to China, have enjoyed zero
tariffs since January 2004. All imports from Hong Kong to mainland China
were exempted from tariffs as of 2006. This special treatment extends to
products with 30% value-added, more advantageous than the conventional
requirement of 40%-50% domestic content. In terms of investment, China
agreed to open 18 service sectors for Hong Kong companies to invest in,
which is more favourable than the measures based on WTO rules. CEPA also
eases requirements for professionals (e.g. accountants, surveyors, and
lawyers) from Hong Kong to operate their business in the mainland, (1) thus
allowing Hong Kong professionals to explore this emerging market. 
Between 2004 and 2013, Hong Kong and China broadened the scope of
CEPA with an additional 10 supplements. Under CEPA and previous supple-
ments, 28 sectors (2) were already partially liberalised for Hong Kong. Since
1 January 2014, conditions for market access for the 28 sectors have been
further relaxed under Supplement X. Supplement X to CEPA also included
various CEPA-plus liberalisation measures covered in the services agreement
signed by China and Taiwan in June 2013 under the Economic Cooperation
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of CEPA) 2008 2014
• Import/export trade, wholesale retail, 
• accommodation and food services
24 28 28 28
• Financial, insurance, real estate, 
• and professional business services 
22 22 28 27
• Transportation, storage and postal services, 
• information and communication
11 12 9 10
• Public administration, social, and 
• personal services
19 19 17 17
• Ownership of premises 11 10 11 11
Subtotal in services 87 91 93 93
• Manufacturing 5 3 2 1
• Construction 5 3 3 4
• Electricity, natural gas and water supply, and waste management 3 3 2 2
Economic growth rate 7.7 8.7 2.1 2.9
Table 1 – Hong Kong’s GDP by sector 2000-2014 (As % of total GDP) 
Framework Agreement (ECFA). (3) To minimise the impact of ECFA on Hong
Kong, the tariff concession under ECFA is applicable to goods shipped
through Hong Kong. To retain cargo flow between Taiwan and China through
Hong Kong, the “Hong Kong Facilitation Scheme for Cross-Strait Tranship-
ment Cargos” was launched in January 2011. (4)
CEPA came at a time when Hong Kong’s economy was struggling after
the massive hollowing out of manufacturing production from the 1990s
onward. Like Taiwan and South Korea, Hong Kong was once an important
export platform for electronic products during the 1960s and 1970s. While
Taiwanese and Korean manufacturers advanced their technology at home
following the relocation of labour-intensive sectors to overseas countries,
Hong Kong manufacturers chose to transform themselves into traders by
making use of their business contacts with local subcontractors based in
mainland China. Consequently, services aimed at supporting manufacturing
activities on the mainland, such as transport and financial services, gradually
developed in Hong Kong. This explains why Hong Kong’s manufacturing in-
dustry experienced a more significant hollowing out than other Asian tigers.
The implementation of CEPA has accelerated this industrial hollowing out
process. As indicated in Table 1, the significance of services in Hong Kong’s
GDP progressed from 87% in 2000 to 93% in 2014. The share of trade,
wholesale, retail, accommodation, and food services has shown particularly
clear growth from 24% of GDP in 2000 to 28% in 2014. During the same
period, financial services in Hong Kong’s economy also expanded noticeably
from 22% to 27%, whereas the weight of the manufacturing sector in GDP
became trivial. Unlike other countries, the growing service share in GDP did
not lead to Hong Kong’s economic stagnation. Over the last decade, Hong
Kong’s economy has continued to expand moderately even with the en-
hancement of services in GDP. Hong Kong maintained relatively high eco-
nomic growth, between 6.5% and 8.7%, from 2004 to 2007. After 2010, the
economy showed a clear deceleration and declined to 2.9% in 2014. The
slowdown was due to the contraction in international trade that indirectly
impacted Hong Kong’s services for international manufacturers. 
Similar to the structural changes in GDP, the quick hollowing out of the
manufacturing sector resulted in an employment dip from 227,000 in 2000
to 105,000 in 2014 (see Table 2). Meanwhile, Hong Kong’s overall unem-
ployment rate declined rapidly from 7.9% in 2003 to 3.5% in 2008 and
3.2% in 2014. The quick drop in unemployment rates implied that the
labour force had successfully shifted to the service sectors at the time when
manufacturing production was diminishing. As shown in Table 2, the em-
ployment increase was especially obvious in financial, insurance, real estate,
and business services (an increase of 284,000 people from the years 2000
to 2014), followed by community, social, and personal services (an increase
of 207,000 persons during the same period). Overall, employment in serv-
ices increased by 661,000 persons, much greater than the loss of employ-
ment in the manufacturing sector (122,000 persons). 
Hong Kong’s service trade expansion
Compared with other Asian peers, Hong Kong’s economic growth and un-
employment rates have remained relatively moderate over the years 2010-
2014. Hong Kong has not experienced the prolonged economic recession that
many Western countries experienced after transforming from a manufacturing
to service-oriented economy. How have services successfully underpinned
Hong Kong’s economy and employment? Given Hong Kong’s limited market
size, the small economy cannot be prosperous without trading with other
countries. Net exports (exports minus imports) are important components in
promoting a country’s economic growth. However, unlike other Asian
economies that rely mostly on exporting manufacturing goods, Hong Kong
has depended on exporting services for its economic survival. Official statistics
show that since 2009, Hong Kong’s service trade balance has turned from
deficit to surplus. While the service trade surplus has continued to grow over
the last few years, its trade balance in goods has been in deficit (see Figure 1). 
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As % of total
employment 
in 2014
• Import/export trade, wholesale and retail, 
• restaurants and hotels 
1,090 1,136 1,177 1,185 95 31
• Financial, insurance, real estate, and business services 453 484 635 737 284 20
• Transport, storage, and communication 349 351 420 424 75 8
• Community, social, and personal services 763 867 857 970 207 26
Subtotal in services 2,655 2,838 3,090 3,316 661 88
• Manufacturing 227 179 142 105 -122 3
• Construction 302 269 268 310 8 8
• Others 28 26 21 19 -9 1
Unemployment rate (%) 5 7 4 3 n/a n/a
Table 2 – Hong Kong’s employment by sector, 2000-2014 (1,000 people) 
Transport services and financial services used to be the two major pillars
in Hong Kong’s service industry. Hong Kong’s transport services were de-
veloped largely based on its intermediary role between China and other
countries. With China’s economic opening up at the end of the 1970s to
the mid-1990s, Hong Kong’s middleman role in China’s external trade was
carried out in the form of “re-export.” Re-export took place when Hong
Kong traders purchased goods from China, carried out simple processing in
Hong Kong (e.g. packaging, marketing, etc.) and resold them elsewhere.
Mainland Chinese goods were sold at a higher price to the global market
than when they entered to Hong Kong. Since the mid-1990s, Hong Kong’s
middleman role has shifted from re-exports to offshore trade. Offshore trade
refers to goods shipped from one country to another without entering Hong
Kong. Companies in Hong Kong involved in offshore trade arranged services
on behalf of buyers and sellers outside Hong Kong and earned service
charges. In terms of financial services, Hong Kong’s sound institutional
framework for finance, a stable currency, and free exchange continued to
consolidate its unique position as a regional financial centre. As a major in-
ternational financial centre, Hong Kong has an integrated network of insti-
tutions and markets providing a variety of financial products and services
with a high degree of liquidity to local and international investors. At the
time when China successfully attracted massive numbers of foreign com-
panies to invest in its manufacturing production, Hong Kong became an
ideal bridgehead for expanding their business in China. Many foreign finan-
cial institutions set up offices or branches in Hong Kong to serve the de-
mand of foreign manufacturers on the mainland. 
Despite the importance of transport and financial services to Hong Kong’s
economy, the development of service trade in recent years is mainly attrib-
uted to the quick growth of surplus in travel services. As shown in Figure 2,
Hong Kong’s trade surplus in services showed clear growth, from HK$27.6
billion in 2009 to HK$234.7 billion in 2014. During this quick development
period, the trade surplus in travel services increased most noticeably, from
HK$6.7 billion to HK$126.7 billion. Although Hong Kong’s trade surplus in
transport services and financial services has developed gradually over the
past few years, the trade surplus from these two items progressed less no-
ticeably compared to travel services.
In terms of service trade partners, the US had been Hong Kong’s main
source of trade surplus. China replaced the US as Hong Kong’s largest source
of trade surplus in services in 2013, accounting for 39% of Hong Kong’s
service exports and 40% of its service imports, far more than Hong Kong’s
other trading partners (see Annex 1). 
Pearl River Delta region behind Hong Kong
transport services development 
In transport, China is Hong Kong’s largest trade partner. In 2013, China
took 18% of Hong Kong’s exports in transport services, the same as the
percentage taken by the US, followed by Japan (9%) and Taiwan (9%). The
mainland also accounted for 20% of Hong Kong’s imports in transport serv-
ices, followed by the US (13%) and Japan (9%) (see Annex 1).
China’s merchandise trade expansion with the outside world could have
resulted in its greater demand for transport services from Hong Kong. This
can be seen from Hong Kong’s rising re-export of goods from the rest of
the world to China, from HK$572 billion in 2002 to HK$1,831 billion in
2012, and as origin of merchandise re-exported from China to other coun-
tries, from HK$864 billion to HK$2,104 billion during the same period. (5)
As for the goods traded, in 2012, 69% of Hong Kong’s re-exported goods
to China consisted of electrical machinery, electrical parts, telecommuni-
cations, sound recording apparatus, office machines, and automatic data
processing machines. It included the re-export of 59% of goods originating
from China. (6) The substantial re-exports to China indicate that Hong Kong
plays the role of a merchandiser, distributor, and provider of other logistics
services in China’s manufacturing production network, particularly in the
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information and communications technology industry. In addition, most of
the re-exports to China are via land, accounting for 72% of total re-exports
from Hong Kong to China, followed by air (17%), ocean (5%), river (5%),
and other (1%) in the same year. Similarly, 75% of goods imported from
China for re-export are via land, followed by air (10%), ocean (8%), river
(5%), and other (2%). (7) The majority of re-exports to and from China via
land suggests that Hong Kong’s trade with China is largely for the Pearl River
Delta region. 
Since China’s opening up to foreign investment in container terminals,
shipping, and cargo forwarding after Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 tour in support
of further economic reforms, Hong Kong’s main container handlers began
to invest in Guangdong’s ports and built up Guangdong’s cargo handling
capacity. With increasing manufacturing production capacity in Guangdong,
it is no longer necessary to bring goods into Hong Kong for packaging or
quality control. CEPA has further allowed Hong Kong companies to set up
more transport-related firms (e.g. logistics, freight forwarding, shipping, and
warehousing services) in the form of wholly-owned operations in the main-
land. In spite of concerns that other mainland cities could quickly catch up
with Hong Kong’s transport services, the territory’s growing trade surplus
in transport vis-à-vis China implies that the relocation of transport services
to Guangdong did not reduce China’s demand for transport services from
Hong Kong. On the other hand, the relocation of physical transport activities
(e.g. cargo handling) to Guangdong provided Hong Kong with opportunities
to upgrade other high value-added services (e.g. the transport of valuable
equipment as well as serving as a centre of supply-chain management). 
The better infrastructure that connects Hong Kong with other mainland
cities will facilitate the division of labour between Hong Kong and China
and further link Hong Kong’s transport service activity more tightly with
that of the mainland. Infrastructure linking Hong Kong with the mainland,
such as the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge (HZMB) (initially announced
to be completed in 2016), will promote Hong Kong’s integration with the
Pearl River Delta region. The Hong Kong section of the Guangzhou-Shen-
zhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link (XRL) (initially announced to be com-
pleted in 2016) will cut journey time not only between Hong Kong and
major cities in the Pearl River Delta region such as Shenzhen, Dongguan,
and Guangzhou but also between Hong Kong and Beijing (10 hours) and
Shanghai (8 hours). As the XRL becomes part of the 16,000 km national
high-speed rail network, Hong Kong’s economic ties with the mainland are
expected to be boosted further. With the gradual transfer of skill and knowl-
edge in services via Hong Kong firms’ investment and quick development
in infrastructure linking Hong Kong with the mainland, cities in the Pearl
River Delta region are poised to take over more of the transport services in
goods and passengers from Hong Kong in the future. 
Hong Kong’s financial services remain
internationally competitive 
China’s contribution to Hong Kong’s exports in financial services in-
cludes the expanded mainland shares listed in Hong Kong, increased
turnover of mainland-related shares in the Hong Kong market, the rise of
merger and acquisition (M&A) activities between Hong Kong and main-
land China, and increased inward portfolio investment from mainland Chi-
nese investors. (8) In addition, over the past few years, Hong Kong has
established itself as the largest offshore centre for the RMB. At the end of
2013, RMB deposits and outstanding RMB certificates of deposit in Hong
Kong exceeded one trillion yuan, accounting for 70% of the offshore pool
of RMB liquidity. (9) The fast-growing RMB pool provides impetus to sup-
port financial product development in Hong Kong, such as fixed income
instruments, derivative products, and publicly traded equity products in
the offshore RMB market.
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Trade balance in transport services
Trade balance in financial services
Trade balance in travel services
Total service trade balance
Since 2004, Hong Kong banks have been allowed to enter the mainland
market under CEPA. (10) From January 2014, CEPA has further allowed Hong
Kong banks on the mainland to provide RMB services to Hong Kong-owned
enterprises in the country. This is expected to broaden the customer base of
Hong Kong banks’ operations for better penetration into the mainland mar-
ket. (11) Growing global interest in trading and investing in mainland-related
securities will also allow Hong Kong to promote new derivative products
linked to equities of mainland enterprises. Besides, there is ample room to
further develop the derivatives market following financial liberalisation in
China. Mainland entities’ interest in investing overseas is also providing great
opportunities for Hong Kong to develop its fund management industry.
Nonetheless, serving China’s financial demands is not without challenges
and difficulties. First, a more developed and open stock exchange in Shang-
hai or Shenzhen may reduce the number of new listings and turnover of
mainland-related shares in Hong Kong and further undermine the growth
of service income from securities transactions, one of the key drivers of fi-
nancial service exports in Hong Kong. (12) From a positive point of view, as
long as the Chinese government continues to grant Hong Kong preferential
access to the mainland market, neither Shanghai nor Shenzhen will be able
to challenge Hong Kong’s unique role as an international business hub and
a global platform for China’s financial businesses. In the long run, Hong Kong
alone cannot serve China’s objective of greater economic and financial in-
tegration with the rest of the world. Hong Kong will have to cooperate and
coordinate with other mainland cities so as to achieve the macro goals of
China’s financial reform. 
Second, the competition in financial services is not coming from mainland
Chinese cities alone. In 2013, China granted a renminbi qualified foreign in-
stitutional investor (RQFII) quota of RMB80 billion to London and RMB50
billion to Singapore. Although quotas granted to London and Singapore are
lower than Hong Kong’s RMB270 billion, China’s widening channels for for-
eign investors buying stocks, bonds, and money market instruments from
London and Singapore have reduced Hong Kong’s edge as the only entry
port to China’s financial market.
Despite the potential challenges from other cities and financial centres,
the impact on Hong Kong’s financial services has been limited so far. At the
end of the third quarter of 2013, Hong Kong’s external financial assets and
liabilities amounted to US$28,240.4 billion and US$22,615.4 billion respec-
tively, or a net external financial asset of US$5,624.9 billion, an increase
from US$5,171.1 billion at the end of 2010. (13) Apart from soaring fund-
raising activities by mainland Chinese enterprises in Hong Kong, continued
expansion in net financial assets is fuelled by the US monetary expansion
policy and Hong Kong’s attractiveness (e.g. efficiency, good infrastructure,
rule of law, and easier access to the China market) to international financial
firms to set up branch offices or headquarters in the territory. The limited
impact from other mainland cities could also be due to the fact that China
accounted for a small portion of Hong Kong’s trade in financial services.
Despite growing opportunities from the gradual opening up of China’s fi-
nancial market, the US remains the largest export destination of financial
services in Hong Kong, accounting for 25% of Hong Kong’s total exports in
financial services in 2013, followed by the UK (16%). China took only 4%
of Hong Kong’s exports in financial services. In terms of imports, the UK
and the US accounted for a respective 15% while China accounted for 7%
(see Annex 1). Hong Kong’s relatively strong connection with the US and
UK in terms of financial service trade and the Hong Kong dollar’s peg to
the US dollar also suggests that a financial crisis in the West would have a
great impact on the territory. China is therefore not only a booming market
for Hong Kong to take advantage of; it could also serve as a last resort in
case a crisis in the West affects the territory.
China as a major contributor to Hong Kong’s
rapid expansion in travel services 
One of the most noticeable developments in mainland-Hong Kong rela-
tions in recent years is the growing number of mainland visitors to Hong
Kong. The number of visitor arrivals in Hong Kong soared from 14 million
in 2001 to 54 million in 2013, with China contributing the lion’s share of
the rise. The share of visitors from mainland China to Hong Kong increased
from 32% in 2001 to 72% in 2013. Of particular note is the growth in main-
land day visitors to Hong Kong. The number of day visitors from the main-
land has exceeded overnight travellers since 2011. Among 41 million
mainland visitor arrivals in 2013, 24 million (59%) were day visitors, while
17 million (41%) stayed overnight in Hong Kong. (14)
The Individual Visit Scheme (IVS) introduced in 2003 is a contributor to
this huge hike in mainland visitors to Hong Kong. The scheme has allowed
Chinese residents in four cities in Guangdong province to visit Hong Kong
and Macao on an individual basis since 2003. The IVS has expanded gradu-
ally, and by January 2007 it covered 49 mainland cities. (15) In April 2009,
the Chinese government launched a year-round multiple entry visa arrange-
ment for Shenzhen residents to visit Hong Kong. In December 2010, the
Chinese government further expanded the IVS for non-Guangdong residents
in Shenzhen. (16) In 2012, the number of mainland visitors to Hong Kong
with a year-round multiple re-entry visa reached 9.8 million, accounting for
43% of all IVS visitors. (17)
Following the rapid growth of visitor arrivals, Hong Kong’s tourism receipts
have grown significantly from HK$44 billion in 2001 to HK$359 billion in
2014. In 2014, 75% of Hong Kong’s overnight tourist spending came from
mainland visitors, with the remaining 25% by visitors from other regions.
Although China’s per capita GDP is relatively lower than that of other coun-
tries, it is surprising to find that the per capita spending of overnight Chinese
tourists in 2014 (HK$8,703) was higher than spending by tourists from
other advanced countries such as the US (HK$7,151), Europe (HK$7,203),
Australia (HK$7,727), New Zealand (HK$6,441), and Japan (HK$5,196). The
rapid growth in mainland visitors might explain the expansion of wholesale,
retail, accommodation, and restaurants in Hong Kong’s GDP and employ-
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ment. The Hong Kong government estimated that the HK$26 billion spent
by mainland Chinese tourists under the IVS in 2012 contributed 1.3% of
Hong Kong’s GDP and 3% of its total employment. (18)
The upsurge in mainland visitors’ spending has made China Hong Kong’s
largest trade partner in travel services, accounting for 79% of its exports in
2013. China is also the largest import source of travel, contributing 31% of
the territory’s total imports in travel and indicating that Hong Kong trav-
ellers spent more in the mainland than in other countries (see Annex 1).
The real commercial benefits for Hong Kongers may be greater than re-
flected in service trade because of Hong Kong travel agencies’ business op-
erations in China. Since 2007, Hong Kong travel agents in Guangdong
Province have been allowed to apply for the operation of group tours to
Hong Kong and Macao for its residents (CEPA Supplement III). Since 2008,
Hong Kong travel agents have been allowed to operate in the Guangxi
Zhuang Autonomous Region and in the provinces of Hunan, Hainan, Fujian,
Jiangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan (CEPA Supplement IV), and in Beijing
and Shanghai since 2011 (CEPA Supplement VII). (19)
Business benefits aside, the sharp rise in mainland visitors to Hong Kong
has brought about growing tension between mainlanders and Hong Kongers
in recent years. The 2012 plan to facilitate non-permanent residents without
household registration documents in Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing,
Guangzhou, and Shenzhen to apply for a visa to Hong Kong was cancelled
only days after the policy was announced. The central government in Beijing
agreed not to add to the number of trial cities for IVS until Hong Kong con-
firms its capability to receive more visitors. (20) The Hong Kong government’s
assessment report estimated that Hong Kong’s tourism sector is well-
equipped to handle the yearly volume of 70 million tourists in 2017, up from
54 million in 2013, although hotel vacancies may remain tight. (21) The fore-
cast was nevertheless criticised by the general public for failing to consider
the impact of robust tourism on residents’ daily lives. Some predicted that
conflicts between locals and mainland tourists would rise if mainland visitors
continue their huge influx. (22) In fact, given Hong Kong’s limited land size but
relatively mature service economy, the development of high value-added
tourism services (e.g. medical services, education, and high-end shopping
tourism) is far more important than promoting visitor numbers. Strength-
ening Hong Kong’s role as a gateway to the mainland market and a spring-
board for mainland enterprises to venture into the global market will also
attract more high-yield business visitors who spend more and stay longer.
Beyond the service trade expansion: Growing
social discontent in Hong Kong
During the time when Hong Kong’ services took advantage of entering
China’s emerging market, China also benefited from Hong Kong’s greater
linkage with the outside world to facilitate mainland companies’ interna-
tionalisation. The number of mainland companies listed in the Hong Kong
stock market increased from 214 in 2002 to 721 in 2012, leading to a surge
in market capitalisation from 27% to 58% during the same period. (23) The
economic integration between the two economies with different levels of
development is supposed to be mutually beneficial. In reality, not everyone
has enjoyed the benefits of greater economic integration. Among 144 coun-
tries survey by the World Factbook, Hong Kong’s Gini index is the 12th high-
est. (24) Growing income inequality in Hong Kong implies that economic
expansion has benefited only a small group of people in society. Without a
more equalised wealth distribution, the increasing economic ties with China
promoted by both market forces and government initiatives have brought
about more and more social discontent.
Since the handover, the mainland Chinese government has tried to con-
struct a united front in support of its Hong Kong policy by incorporating
local Pro-Beijing capitalists into several institutional bodies. Nonetheless,
the new state-business alliance after 1997 has not consolidated Beijing’s
governance in Hong Kong. Instead, there has been a growing dissatisfaction
towards the Beijing government in Hong Kong society. In the policy-making
process, the post-colonial state has also been confronting various agents of
business interests and has even been dragged into conflicts among com-
peting business groups. Unlike during the British colonial period, the business
sector has become distanced from the local community. The state-business
alliance established on the government’s relations with a few Chinese busi-
ness tycoons was fragile and vulnerable. (25) Despite the brilliant economic
figures, the mainland-Hong Kong economic integration process has not
been accompanied by political and social harmony. Over the past 15 years,
Hong Kong society has experienced several demonstrations against the
Hong Kong government, most notably the Occupy Central Movement in
2014. Although the movement ended without any concessions to the pro-
testors, the Hong Kong government’s ability to govern the territory is widely
considered to have weakened further after the movement. 
In sum, the visible business benefits to the territory following intensified
economic integration with China has not eased the growing tension between
mainlanders and Hong Kongers. The growing social discontent with immi-
grants and tourists from the mainland and weak public confidence towards
the Hong Kong government have raised concerns over whether the Hong
Kong-mainland economic integration can proceed smoothly in the future.
Mainland officials regard Hong Kong as part of China and feel that both sides
should work for China’s interest. On the other hand, Hong Kongers are used
to embracing the entire world and positioning themselves as part of a global
village. These different ideologies will continue to set Hong Kong apart from
the mainland socially and politically despite closer economic ties. 
Concluding remarks
Over the last decade, Hong Kong has maintained moderate economic
growth rates and its unemployment rate has also remained at a relatively
low level. The territory’s greater integration with China through trade, fi-
N o . 2 0 1 6 / 2  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 43
18. Ibid., p.34.
19. Trade and Industry Department, Hong Kong SAR, “Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic
Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), Travel Agency and Tour Operators, Liberalization Measures under
CEPA,” www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/tradeservices/tou_liberalization.html (accessed on 14 Feb-
ruary 2014).
20. “Commerce and Economic Development Bureau, Hong Kong SAR, “Xianggang chengshou ji jiedai
lüke nengli pinggu baogao” (Assessment report on Hong Kong’s capacity to receive tourists),
op. cit., p. 1.
21. Ibid., pp. 34-38.
22. “Annual Tourists to Hong Kong Could Rise to 70 Million in Three Years, Commission Says,” South
China Morning Post, 17 January 2014, www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1407779/visitor-
numbers-can-rise-70m-three-years-commission-says?page=all (accessed on 14 February 2014).
23. Trade Office of the Economic Affairs Department of the Liaison Office of the Central People’s
Government in HK SAR, “CEPA shishi cujin qiye zou chuqu” (CEPA promotes the implementation
of enterprises to go), 12 September 2013, http://big5.mofcom.gov.cn/gate/big5/
hk.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztdy/201309/20130900300766.shtml (accessed on 27 July 2014).
24. “Country Comparison, Distribution of Family Income,” The World Factbook, Central Intelligence
Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2172rank.html
(accessed on 14 January 2015).
25. Brian C.H. Fong, Hong Kong’s Governance under Chinese Sovereignty: The Failure of the State-
Business Alliance after 1997, London, New York, Routledge, p. 121.
Chiang Min-Hua – Sustaining Hong Kong’s Services amid the Changing Dynamics of China’s Economy
nancial links, and tourism has apparently underpinned its service-oriented
economy. The manufacturing production network in the Pearl River Delta
Region has offered Hong Kong a chance to develop high value-added trans-
port services. China’s gradual financial reform brings hope for advancement
of Hong Kong’s financial services. Hong Kong’s trade surplus has shown par-
ticularly rapid growth in travel services owing to the considerable spending
by large numbers of visitors from mainland China. CEPA apparently consol-
idated the Hong Kong-mainland division of labour in which the territory’s
service role is reinforced. 
Looking into the future, China’s continued economic expansion and
greater involvement with the world economy will offer both opportunities
and challenges for Hong Kong’s service sectors. Meanwhile, Hong Kong-
mainland economic integration will continue in spite of the mounting social
discontent in Hong Kong in recent years. Enhancing Hong Kong’s role as an
“international city” (e.g. consolidating Hong Kong’s role as a regional head-
quarters for multinational enterprises and maintaining its international stan-
dard in education, regulatory environment, and business services, etc.) may
reduce Hong Kongers’ dissatisfaction with the mainland government.
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Note: The percentages are calculated by the author.
Source: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong SAR, Hong Kong Trade in Services Statistics in 2013, February 2015. 
Export
(HK$ 
billion) China USA UK Japan Taiwan Others
1. Manufacturing services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2. Maintenance and repair services 2.4 15 48 4 5 4 23
3. Transport 242.4 18 18 6 9 9 40
4. Travel 302.0 79 2 1 1 2 15
5. Construction 3.0 0 0 0 0 0 100
6. Insurance and pension services 7.9 37 6 5 12 12 28
7. Financial services 127.8 4 25 16 2 1 51
8. Charges for the use of intellectual property 4.5 28 15 9 5 0 44
9. Telecommunications, computer and information services 20.5 31 9 10 4 2 44
10. Other business services 99.5 17 31 6 5 2 40
11. Personal, cultural, and recreational services 1.8 0 0 0 0 0 100
12. Government goods and services 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 100
Total exports in services 812.4 39 14 6 4 4 32
Imports
(HK$ 
billion) China USA UK Japan Taiwan Others
1. Manufacturing services 116.0 100 0 0 0 0 0
2. Maintenance and repair services 0.8 24 11 12 3 7 42
3. Transport 140.6 20 13 4 9 5 49
4. Travel 164.5 31 9 7 10 8 35
5. Construction 2.7 0 0 0 0 0 100
6. Insurance and pension services 10.4 29 27 4 4 2 34
7. Financial services 32.7 7 15 15 7 3 54
8. Charges for the use of intellectual property 15.7 5 37 9 15 1 32
9. Telecommunications, computer and information services 12.8 32 14 15 4 2 32
10. Other business services 85.0 36 16 7 6 3 33
11. Personal, cultural, and recreational services 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 100
12. Government goods and services 1.2 0 0 0 0 0 100
Total imports in services 583.2 40 11 6 7 4 33
Annex 1 – Hong Kong’s top five trade partners by service items in 2013
Exports by destination (%)
Imports by source (%)
China’s developing economy will also benefit from Hong Kong’s greater
commercial ties with the outside world. For example, Hong Kong is like a
trial area for China’s full economic liberalisation in the future. 
As an international city, Hong Kong is set to benefit from growing re-
gional economic integration. Hong Kong’s initiative to launch FTA with the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is set to reinforce its cen-
tral role in providing services to East Asia’s economic network. The FTA
with ASEAN will also put Hong Kong in good stead to compete with Sin-
gapore, another regional financial and logistics service centre. Besides, in
spite of the rapid regional economic integration in terms of trade and in-
vestment in recent years, the entire region has yet to be integrated finan-
cially. Hong Kong’s strength in financial services could therefore enhance
China’s financial muscle in linking with regional economies. Furthermore,
Hong Kong may also be an ideal bridge between China and the US-led
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Its more advanced economy qualifies it for
membership to the TPP. Granting Hong Kong the right to join the TPP is
also a significant step for China to show its goodwill towards this cross-
regional trade agreement. In fact, stable and cooperative China-US rela-
tions are critical for Hong Kong’s future. Despite China’s growing weight
in Hong Kong’s economy, US influence in Hong Kong is as significant as
before simply because most of the financial assets in Hong Kong are still
in US dollars. Hence, even with the tremendous potential opportunities
from the RMB’s internationalisation, the stability of the US currency will
remain important to facilitating the development of Hong Kong’s financial
sector in the foreseeable future. 
Hong Kong’s service economy will continue to prosper in the near term
with China’s continuous special treatment. In the long run, strengthening
Hong Kong’s bridging role between mainland China and the global market
will be crucial for the viability of its services. The Hong Kong government
will have to take more ambitious initiatives to strengthen the competitive-
ness of its service sectors, cooperate rather than compete with mainland
cities, and diversify its external economic relations instead of relying on the
mainland government’s special treatment for its economic survival. 
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